1. After acquiring the power of writing and thinking, as described in the preceding book, and also of
pleading extempore, if occasion demand, our next
task will be to ensure that appropriateness of speech,
which Cicero
1 shows to be the fourth department of
style, and which is, in my opinion, highly necessary.
[
2]
For since the ornaments of style are varied and
manifold and suited for different purposes, they will,
unless adapted to the matter and the persons concerned, not merely fail to give our style distinction,
but will even destroy its effect and produce a result
quite the reverse of that which our matter should
produce. For what profit is it that our words should
be Latin, significant and graceful, and be further
embellished with elaborate figures and rhythms,
unless all these qualities are in harmony with the
views to which we seek to lead the judge and mould
his opinions?
[
3]
What use is it if we employ a lofty
tone in cases of trivial import, a slight and refined
style in cases of great moment, a cheerful tone when
our matter calls for sadness, a gentle tone when it
demands vehemence, threatening language when
supplication, and submissive when energy is required, or fierceness and violence when our theme is
one that asks for charm? Such incongruities are as
unbecoming as it is for men to wear necklaces and
pearls and flowing raiment which are the natural
adornments of women, or for women to robe
[p. 157]
themselves in the garb of triumph, than which there can
be conceived no more majestic raiment.
[
4]
This topic
is discussed by Cicero in the third book of the
de
Oratore,2 and, although he touches on it but lightly,
he really covers the whole subject when he says,
One single style of oratory is not suited to every case, nor
to every audience, nor every speaker, nor every occasion.
And he says the same at scarcely greater length in
the
Orator.3 But in the first of these works Lucius
Crassus, since he is speaking in the presence of men
distinguished alike for their learning and their eloquence, thinks it sufficient merely to indicate this topic
to his audience for their recognition;
[
5]
while in the
latter work Cicero asserts that, as these facts are
familiar to Brutus, to whom that treatise is addressed,
they will be given briefer treatment, despite the fact
that the subject is a wide one and is discussed at
greater length by the philosophers. 1, on the other
hand, have undertaken the education of an orator,
and, consequently, am speaking not merely to those
that know, but also to learners; I shall, therefore,
have some claim to forgiveness if I discuss the topic
in greater detail.
[
6]
For this reason, it is of the first importance that
we should know what style is most suitable for conciliating, instructing or moving the judge, and what
effects we should aim at in different parts of our
speech. Thus we shall eschew antique, metaphorical and newly-coined words in our
exordium, statement of facts and
arguments, as we shall avoid flowing
periods woven with elaborate grace, when the case
has to be divided and distinguished under its various
heads, while, on the other hand, we shall not employ
mean or colloquial language, devoid of all artistic
[p. 159]
structure, in the
peroration, nor, when the theme calls
for compassion, attempt to dry the tears of our audience with jests.
[
7]
For all ornament derives its effect
not from its own qualities so much as from the
circumstances in which it is applied, and the occasion
chosen for saying anything is at least as important a
consideration as what is actually said. But the whole
of this question of appropriate language turns on
something more than our choice of style, for it has
much in common with invention. For if words can
produce such an impression, how much greater must
that be which is created by the facts themselves.
But I have already laid down rules for the treatment
of the latter in various portions of this work.
[
8]
Too much insistence cannot be laid upon the point
that no one can be said to speak appropriately who
has not considered not merely what it is expedient,
but also what it is becoming to say. I am well
aware that these two considerations generally go
hand in hand. For whatever is becoming is, as a
rule, useful, and there is nothing that does more to
conciliate the good-will of the judge than the
observance or to alienate it than the disregard of
these considerations.
[
9]
Sometimes, however, the two
are at variance. Now, whenever this occurs, expediency must yield to the demands of what is
becoming. Who is there who does not realise that
nothing would have contributed more to secure the
acquittal of Socrates than if he had employed the
ordinary forensic methods of defence and had
conciliated the minds of his judges by adopting a
submissive tone and had devoted his attention to
refuting the actual charge against him?
[
10]
But such
a course would have been unworthy of his character,
[p. 161]
and, therefore, he pleaded as one who would account
the penalty to which he might be sentenced as the
highest of honours. The wisest of men preferred to
sacrifice the remnant of his days rather than to cancel
all his past life. And since he was but ill understood by the men of his own day, he reserved his
case for the approval of posterity and at the cost of
a few last declining years achieved through all the
ages life everlasting.
[
11]
And so although Lysias, who
was accounted the first orator of that time, offered
him a written defence, he refused to make use of
it, since, though he recognised its excellence, he
regarded it as unbecoming to himself. This instance alone shows that the end which the orator
must keep in view is not persuasion, but speaking
well, since there are occasions when to persuade
would be a blot upon his honour. The line adopted
by Socrates was useless to secure his acquittal, but
was of real service to him as a man; and that is by
far the greater consideration.
[
12]
In drawing this distinction between what is expedient and what is
becoming, I have followed rather the usage of common speech than the strict law of truth; unless,
indeed, the elder Africanus
4 is to be regarded as
having failed to consult his true interests, when he
retired into exile sooner than wrangle over his own
innocence with a contemptible tribune of the people,
or unless it be alleged that Publius Rutilius
5 was
ignorant of his true advantage both on the occasion
when he adopted a defence which may almost be
compared with that of Socrates, and when he preferred to remain in exile rather than return at Sulla's
bidding.
[
13]
No, these great men regarded all those
trifles that the most abject natures regard as
[p. 163]
advantageous, as being contemptible if weighed in the
balance with virtue, and for this reason they have
their reward in the deathless praise of all generations. Let not us, then, be so poor spirited as to
regard the acts, which we extol, as being inexpedient.
[
14]
However, it is but rarely that this distinction, such
as it is, is called into play. As I have said, the
expedient and the becoming will, as a rule, be
identical in every kind of case. Still, there are two
things which will be becoming to all men at all times
and in all places, namely, to act and speak as befits a
man of honour, and it will never at any time beseem
any man to speak or act dishonourably. On the
other hand, things of minor importance and occupying something like a middle position between the
two are generally of such a nature that they may be
conceded to some, but not to others, while it will
depend on the character of the speaker and the
circumstances of time, place and motive whether we
regard them as more or less excusable or reprehensible.
[
15]
When, however, we are speaking of our
own affairs or those of others, we must distinguish
between the expedient and the becoming, while
recognising that the majority of the points which
we have to consider will fall under neither head.
In the first place, then, all kinds of boasting are a
mistake, above all, it is an error for an orator to praise
his own eloquence, and, further, not merely wearies,
but in the majority of cases disgusts the audience.
[
16]
For there is ever in the mind of man a certain
element of lofty and unbending pride that will not
brook superiority: and for this reason we take delight in raising the humble and submissive to their
feet, since such an act gives us a consciousness of our
[p. 165]
superiority, and as soon as all sense of rivalry disappears, its place is taken by a feeling of humanity.
But the man who exalts himself beyond reason is
looked upon as depreciating and showing a contempt
for others and as making them seem small rather
than himself seem great.
[
17]
As a result, those who are
beneath him feel a grudge against him (for those who
are unwilling to yield and yet have not the strength
to hold their own are always liable to this failing),
while his superiors laugh at him and the good
disapprove. Indeed, as a rule, you will find that
arrogance implies a false self-esteem, whereas those
who possess true merit find satisfaction enough in
the consciousness of possession.
Cicero has been severely censured in this connexion, although he was far more given to boasting
of his political achievements than of his eloquence,
at any rate, in his speeches.
[
18]
And as a rule he had
some sound reason for his self-praise. For he was
either defending those who had assisted him to crush
the conspiracy of Catiline, or was replying to attacks
made upon him by those who envied his position;
attacks which he was so far unable to withstand
that he suffered exile as the penalty for having
saved his country. Consequently, we may regard
his frequent reference to the deeds accomplished
in his consulship as being due quite as much to the
necessities of defence as to the promptings of vainglory.
[
19]
As regards his own eloquence, he never
made immoderate claims for it in his pleading, while
he always paid a handsome tribute to the eloquence
of the advocate, who opposed him. For example,
there are passages such as the following: “If there
be aught of talent in me, and I am only too conscious
[p. 167]
how little it is,”
6 and, “In default of talent, I turned
to industry for aid.”
7
[
20]
Again, in his speech against
Caecilius on the selection of an accuser for Verres,
despite the fact that the question as to which was
the most capable pleader, was a factor of great
importance, he rather depreciated his opponent's
eloquence than exalted his own, and asserted that
he had done all in his power to make himself an
orator,
8 though he knew he had not succeeded.
[
21]
In
his letters to intimate friends, it is true, and occasionally in his dialogues, he tells the truth of his own
eloquence, though in the latter case he is careful
always to place the remarks in question in the
mouth of some other character. And yet I am not
sure that open boasting is not more tolerable, owing
to its sheer straightforwardness, than that perverted
form of self-praise, which makes the millionaire say
that he is not a poor man, the man of mark describe
himself as obscure, the powerful pose as weak,
and the eloquent as unskilled and even inarticulate.
[
22]
But the most ostentatious kind of boasting takes
the form of actual self-derision. Let us therefore
leave it to others to praise us. For it beseems us,
as Demosthenes says, to blush even when we are
praised by others. I do not mean to deny that
there are occasions when an orator may speak of
his own achievements, as Demosthenes himself does
in his defence of Ctesiphon.
9 But on that occasion
he qualified his statements in such a way as to show
that he was compelled by necessity to do so, and to
throw the odium attaching to such a proceeding on
the man who had forced him to it.
[
23]
Again, Cicero
often speaks of his suppression of the Catilinarian
conspiracy, but either attributes his success to the
[p. 169]
courage shown by the senate or to the providence of
the immortal gods. If he puts forward stronger claims
to merit, it is generally when speaking against his
enemies and detractors; for he was bound to defend
his actions when they were denounced as discreditable.
[
24]
One could only wish that he had shown
greater restraint in his poems, which those who love
him not are never weary of criticising. I refer to
passages such as:
10
“Let arms before the peaceful toga yield,
Laurels to eloquence resign the field,
”
or
“O happy Rome, born in my consulship!”
together with that “Jupiter, by whom he is
summoned to the assembly of the gods,” and the
“Minerva that taught him her accomplishments”;
extravagances which he permitted himself in imitation of certain precedents in Greek literature.
[
25]
But while it is unseemly to make a boast of one's
eloquence, it is, however, at times permissible to
express confidence in it. Who, for instance, can
blame the following?
11